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While the proliferation of online markets has presented competition authorities with 
a string of challenges of diverse nature, the price parity phenomenon depicts 
particularly well the Commission's 'fight-chaos-with-chaos' approach to digital 
economy. Indeed, the EU watchdog's passive attitude towards the multiple enquiries 
into most-favoured-nation clauses by different national trustbusters across the Old 
Continent risks going down in universal history of antitrust infamy. With the 
awareness that rivers of ink have already been poured over the subject, this paper 
adopts a brand new stance by looking on its opportunity side. In the light of the timid 
open-mindedness recently shown by the European Court of Justice as regards the 
object-effect dichotomy in Groupement des Cartes Bancaires and Maxima 
Latvija judgements (which seem to steer away from Pierre Fabre's sternness), I will 
discuss different national solutions with a view to vindicating not only a more 
consistent but also an unprejudiced effects-based approach that should transport 
analogue EU law enforcement to the digital era. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Only eclipsed by the crusade against Google, the generalised recourse to 
so-called most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses by online platforms stands 
out among other digital-economy anathemas for the implications vis-à-vis 
EU competition policy of divergent national enforcement reactions. The 
danger for EU law uniformity that these divergences involve has become 
particularly serious as far as legal qualification has gained relevance in order 
to determine the assessment to which the conduct should be subject after 
recent judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).1 By redefining the 
traditionally exorbitant notion of conducts presumed to be restrictive by 
their own object (without need to analyse their effects), the judges in 
Luxembourg have paved the way for a bold policy-driven move towards the 
long-awaited (and never come) 'more economic approach'. Unfortunately, 
the Commission appears to have given up enforcement in this uncharted 
domain to national competition authorities (NCAs). 
 
This paper challenges the Commission's passivity towards price parity 
clauses, insofar as its wait-and-see approach has led to blessings and curses on 
the side of different NCAs, ranging from the Swedish benevolence to the 
German ordo-liberal admonition. Moreover, this voyeurism of the European 
authority is not new nor is it endemic to price parity clauses. On the contrary, 
it smacks of previous twists and turns to conceal a relegation of the EU 
interest, already condemned by the General Court in CEAHR,2 which I will 
evoke in Section II. Furthermore, other recent developments in e-commerce 
                                                 
1 Cases C-67/13 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires, and C-
345/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:784, Maxima Latvija. 
2 Case T-427/08, ECLI:EU:T:2010:517, CEAHR v Commission, paras 157-178. 
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‒ that fall outside the scope of this paper ‒ have befallen the same fate (e.g. 
bans on online selling). 
 
To provide an insight into the issue, after justifying why EU guidelines are 
needed on the subject at stake, I will begin with an overview of the different 
theories of harm that may apply to MFN clauses and the potential 
efficiencies to which they may give rise. A discussion on the contrasting views 
taken by the Swedish, Italian, French, German and British competition 
watchdogs will follow in order to underscore the need for common guidance. 
Then, I will focus on the legal qualification of price parity clauses, which 
might have an impact on their consideration as either by-object or by-effect 
restrictions, now that the ECJ is revisiting this fundamental dichotomy. 
Finally, I will conclude by pleading in favour of a common facts-based and 
effects-oriented approach being embraced by the Commission as the best 
(and possibly the only) fit with digital-world restrictions. 
 
II. NEED FOR EU GUIDANCE 
 
As a preface to the discussion that follows, it is necessary to address the 
question whether the Commission's shying away from leading enforcement 
as regards online restrictions is an unequivocally ill-conceived strategy. It is 
certain that the de-centralised paradigm brought about by Regulation 
1/20033 has borne fruits over its thirteen years of existence, but the new 
features of the digital economy have dramatically changed the business and 
economic assumptions on which its design is based. This evolution has 
evinced the need for some adjustments, as the Commission acknowledged (at 
least impliedly) by launching a public consultation on empowering the NCAs 
to be more effective enforcers.4 Of course, it does not mean that the 
de-centralisation process required by the principle of subsidiarity has to be 
reverted, but the appropriate dose of EU action must be inoculated in order 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
4 Commission, 'Empowering the national competition authorities to be more 
effective enforcers' 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/index_en
.html> accessed on 10 June 2016. 
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not to err on the side of excessive divergence. After all, the whole system 
devised by Regulation 1/2003 rests in a fair (and delicate) trade-off between 
subsidiarity and proportionality, on the one hand, and uniformity and legal 
certainty, on the other. 
 
Indeed, the Commission appears to be awakening to this reality, although its 
latest reaction − in the form of a Communication supplementing the two 2015 
legislative proposals on the supply of digital content and on online and other 
distance sales of goods − is mainly focused on unilateral discrimination (i.e. 
geo-blocking and geo-filtering).5 It is true that concerns posed by 
geo-blocking and geo-filtering may seem to have more evident implications 
vis-à-vis the single market imperative, thereby calling for closer attention by 
the EU legislator at first sight. However, as far as Article 101 infringements 
could equally hamper cross-border e-commerce, certain guidance by the 
European trustbuster cannot be put off for a number of reasons. 
 
From an economic standpoint, it is certain that different national regulatory 
treatments of online restrictions run counter the goals of the Digital Single 
Market, namely better access for consumers and businesses to goods and 
services offered online across Europe; greater trust for consumers and 
certainty for businesses with clear, less fragmented rules for online sales of 
goods; and lower transaction costs and administrative burden for businesses 
when trading online across borders.6 In the same vein, concerning online 
platforms, an EU policy approach is necessary to 'avoid fragmentation and 
obstacles in the Digital Single Market', insofar as 'different national rules can 
otherwise create uncertainty for economic operators, make scaling-up more 
difficult for startups and limit the availability of digital services'.7 
                                                 
5 Commission, 'Commission updates EU audiovisual rules and presents targeted 
approach to online platforms' (Press release, 25 May 2016) <http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/press-release_IP-16-1873_en.htm> accessed on 10 June 2016. 
6 Commission, 'Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market 
Opportunities and Challenges for Europe' <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/communication-online-platforms-and-digital-
single-market-opport 
unities-and-challenges-europe> accessed on 10 June 2016. 
7 Commission, 'Digital Single Market – Commission updates EU audiovisual rules and 
presents targeted approach to online platforms' (Press release, 25 May 2016) 
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A further argument is provided by fiscal federalism, which assumes that the 
allocation of functions in a multilevel polity should pursue the minimisation 
of inter-jurisdictional spill-over effects in the provision of public goods.8 The 
assignment decision ultimately boils down to a trade-off between the losses 
derived from failure to internalise inter-jurisdictional spill-over effects and a 
second element traditionally associated with the failure to identify local 
preferences and linked by 'second-generation' theories to various 
centralisation inefficiencies (e.g. misallocations resulting from imperfect 
information or reduced accountability at central level).9 Therefore, uniform 
enforcement across the EU is needed to internalise cross-border externalities 
inherent to genuinely supranational digital trends. Additionally, assuming 
that an efficient level of public good output is set by an authority whose 
jurisdictional scope encompasses the geographic range of the benefits arising 
from that public good,10 the Commission should decide (or at least make 
uniform) the efficient intensity of an enforcement action from which the 
single market as a whole would derive advantage. 
 
The same reasoning, construed in terms of subsidiarity, militates in favour of 
the greater effectiveness of EU-level action in an inherently cross-border 
field as is e-commerce. Subsidiarity and proportionality,11 enshrined in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union, along 
with uniformity and legal certainty,12 preside over the Regulation 1/2003 
setting, be it because the national enforcement of EU competition law can be 
considered a shared competence13 or simply because 'the institutional 
arrangements governing competition are specifically designed to be in 
                                                 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1895_en.htm> accessed on 10 
June 2016. 
8 Albert Breton, Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and 
Public Finance (CUP 1998) 185. 
9 Wallace E Oates, 'Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism' (2005) 
12 International Tax and Public Finance 349, 356-360. 
10 ibid, 351. 
11 Council (fn 3), Recital 34. 
12 Council (fn 3), Recitals 1 and 22. 
13 Loïc Azoulai, The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP 2014) 102. 
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accordance with the principle of subsidiarity'.14 Consequently, as online 
phenomena by their own nature go beyond the sphere of national action, the 
objectives of an enforcement action aiming at them could not be in principle 
sufficiently achieved by NCAs, and the Commission would be better placed 
by reason of the action's scale or effects. Nevertheless, under the principle of 
proportionality, EU action cannot exceed what is necessary 'to allow the 
Community competition rules to be applied effectively'.15 
 
The interplay between those principles relies on the cooperation system 
provided for in article 11 of Regulation 1/2003. Nonetheless, in the case of 
MFN clauses, coordination within the European Competition Network 
(ECN) has led to divergent outcomes in the absence of greater involvement 
of the EU trustbuster. Consequently, as a first step, the Commission should 
issue clear guidelines on how to deal with online restrictions by means of 
soft-law instruments that provide NCAs with a systematic and policy-driven 
theoretical foundation on which to base constructive dialogue within the 
ECN. Additionally, the Commission's proactive intervention as amicus 
curiae in national judicial proceedings under Article 15 of Regulation 1/200316 
could contribute to steer the debate towards the enforcement approach 
proposed in Sections III.4 and IV. 
 
A more drastic alternative to be pondered over at this stage would be relieving 
NCAs of their EU competition law enforcement competence under article 
11(6) of Regulation 1/2003, provided that the Commission considers the 
scenario in which the MFN phenomenon produces its effects − featured by a 
number of Member States being affected by an essentially cross-border 
conduct carried out by EU-based actors (e.g. Booking.com), as well as non-
EU based players (e.g. Expedia) − similar to the one depicted by the General 
Court in CEAHR: 
                                                 
14 Her Majesty's Government, 'Review of the Balance of Competences between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union. Competition and Consumer Policy 
Report' (2014) para 1.11. 
15 Council (fn 3), Recital 34. 
16 Patricia Vidal and Pablo Solano, 'Towards a More EU Consistent Approach To The 
Analysis of Vertical Restraints in the E-Commerce Sector' (2016) 2(2) Competition 
Law and Policy Debate 45, 46. 
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The practice complained of exists in at least five Member States, or possibly 
in all the Member States, and is attributable to undertakings which have their 
head offices and places of production outside of the European Union, which 
suggests that action at European Union level could be more effective than 
various actions at national level.17 
 
Finally, from the policy viewpoint, if the Commission were not to lead the 
way into the unknown domain of online restrictions, a unique opportunity to 
embrace an effects-based approach ‒ in a field particularly well suited for 
(and requiring) factual case-by-case analysis ‒ would be foregone. Certainly, 
when it comes to digital economy, anticompetitive and procompetitive 
effects are not as univocal as they are in the analogue world and, thus, the 
room for presumptions is more limited. It is equally true that an unknown 
issue could benefit from national experimentation under ECN coordination, 
but only sound EU guidance can ward off the increasing temptation for 
NCAs to adopt a comfortable 'by-object' approach to online restrictions, 
against which the outgoing chief economist of the Commission has recently 
warned.18 
 
III. PRICE PARITY CLAUSES 
 
After justifying the need for an EU approach to online restrictions, I will 
introduce price parity clauses as a type of restraint that illustrates particularly 
well the lack of a common frame of reference in the digital economy. At a 
second stage, I will present the divergent outcomes resulting from the 
Commission's failure to keep national watchdogs on a leash and discuss the 
importance of legal qualification as an additional factor calling for the EU 
common enforcement approach sketched as an epilogue to this Section. 
 
                                                 
17 CEAHR (fn 2), para 176. 
18 Lewis Crofts and Mari Eccles, 'Enforcers must understand the "rationale" behind 
online trade restrictions, Motta says' (MLex, 3 June 2016) <http://www.mlex.com/ 
GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=800911&siteid=190&rdir=1> accessed on 7 
June 2016. 
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1. Concept, Types and Theories of Harm 
A price parity or MFN clause can be broadly defined as 'an agreement 
whereby a seller agrees that a buyer will benefit from terms that are at least as 
favourable as those offered by the seller to any other buyer'.19 In practice, 
price parity clauses have been extensively used by multi-sided online 
platforms (which operate as interfaces between different groups of users 
whose demand is interdependent). The consolidation of business models 
based on multi-sided platforms gives price parity clauses the potential to 
affect millions of consumers purchasing all types of goods or services over the 
internet. 
 
For instance, Booking.com ‒ an online travel agency (OTA) rendering free 
searching, comparison and booking services for users while charging hotels a 
proportional fee per reservation ‒ imposed on hotels the obligation for the 
latter to offer through Booking.com equal or more advantageous prices, as 
well as at least equal availability of overnight stays, for the same type of 
accommodation, date, type of bed and number of customers than those 
offered through the hotels' direct channel or through competing OTAs.20 
 
Price parity clauses are only tangentially touched upon in the Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints as a 'supportive' measure to make direct or indirect price 
fixing more effective or to make maximum or recommended prices work as 
fixed ones.21 However, since this paper vindicates clearer (or at least any) 
guidance on MFN clauses, I will embark upon a 'lex ferenda' exercise in this 
Section with a view to identifying the factors to be taken into account when 
analysing such clauses form an EU competition law viewpoint. 
 
Although the effects of price parity clauses also depend on other factors such 
as likelihood of application and monitoring, position of the parties to the 
contract in which they are included, or market environment (i.e. degree of 
                                                 
19 Francisco E González-Díaz and Matthew Bennett, 'The Law and Economics of 
Most-Favoured Nation Clauses' (2015) 1(3) Competition Law and Policy Debate 26, 
27. 
20 Autorité de la Concurence 21 April 2015 15-D-06, para 56. 
21 Commission, 'Guidelines on Vertical Restraints' (Notice) [2010] OJ C130/01, para 
48. 
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rivalry at the different levels of the supply chain, density of the MFN weave 
or market transparency), the three criteria presented below are particularly 
useful to classify such clauses and to identify the associated theory of harm.22 
In any event, a case-by-case analysis is required.23 
 
First and foremost, the level of the supply chain at which the clauses operate 
has to be considered. MFN clauses may be set at the retail level, stipulating 
that the price and other commercial conditions applied by a retailer to the 
goods or services of a particular supplier cannot be less favourable than those 
offered by a competing retailer in relation to the same supplier's goods or 
services. They can also be in place at the wholesale level, establishing that the 
conditions offered by a wholesaler to a retailer must be at least equally 
favourable as those offered to a competing retailer.24 
 
Secondly, the business model is to be factored in. Whereas the wholesale 
model is featured by an agreement on the price that the upstream seller 
charges the online platform (which operates as a retailer and remains free to 
quote any final price), the agency model entails that the online platform acts 
as a agent for the seller by marketing the principal's goods of services in 
exchange for a commission for each sale made.25 In this second scenario, the 
seller sets the retail price without falling foul of Article 101 only to the extent 
that the online platform qualifies as a genuine agent in the sense of the 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints.26 
 
                                                 
22 Ingrid Vandenborre and Michael J Frese, 'Most Favoured Nation Clauses Revisited' 
(2014) 35(12) ECLR 588, 592. 
23 Lear, 'Can "Fair" Prices Be Unfair? A Review of Price Relationship Agreements' 
(2012) OFT Report 1438, para 6.75 
<http://www.learlab.com/pdf/oft1438_1347291420. 
pdf> accessed on 8 May 2016. 
24 Justin P Johnson, 'The Agency Model and MFN Clauses' (2014) Cornell University 
‒ Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, 1 <http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2217849> accessed on 7 May 2016. 
25 Ariel Ezrachi, 'The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce' 
(2015) 55 Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper, 2 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2672541> 
accessed on 7 May 2016. 
26 Commission (fn 21), paras 12-21. 
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The agency model increases the potential for restriction of parity clauses by 
eliminating the possibility for the principal to use the quotation of lower 
prices on the platform as a reward for the agent lowering its commission. 
However, in this setting, MFN clauses may promote competitive pricing on 
the platform by preventing the seller from charging a 'monopoly price' (i.e. 
price over the competitive level).27 Thus, a sufficient degree of inter-brand 
competition (i.e. among sellers) could make up for the loss of intra-brand 
competition (i.e. among platforms), as explored further below. 
 
On the contrary, under the wholesale model, price parity clauses do not raise 
concerns as long as they do not impair the retailer's freedom to set the price.28 
In fact, they contribute to guaranteeing a competitive cost structure for the 
platform.29 Nonetheless, by way of example, they might be considered 
restrictive if they have the effect of reducing the retailer's bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the wholesaler, which would encroach on the retailer's freedom to 
set final prices thereby precluding it from obtaining price reductions that 
could otherwise be passed onto consumers.30 
 
Thirdly, the scope of the clause is particularly decisive in ascertaining its 
anticompetitive effect. Broad MFN clauses (i.e. agreements by virtue of 
which a seller commits to advertising on an online platform equal or lower 
prices than listed on competing online marketplaces) present a higher 
potential for reduction of price competition. In particular, online platforms 
protected by broad retail MFN clauses under the agency model are 
incentivised to charge sellers higher (or, at least, not lower) commissions 
since these higher commissions will not translate into higher advertised 
prices. Likewise, there are no incentives for platforms to reduce commissions 
                                                 
27 Michael L Weiner and Craig G Falls, 'Counseling on MFNs After E-books' (2014) 
28(3) Antitrust Magazine 68, 71. 
28 Oxera, 'Most-favoured-nation clauses: falling out of favour?' (Agenda, November 
2014) <http://www.oxera.com/Latest-Thinking/Agenda/2014/Most-favoured-natio 
n-clauses-falling-out-of-favour.aspx#_ftn6> accessed on 7 June 2016. 
29 Weiner and Falls (fn 27), 71. 
30 Jonathan B Baker and Judith A Chevalier, 'The Competitive Consequences of Most-
Favored-Nation Provisions' (2013) 27(2) Antitrust Magazine 20, 24. 
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charged on the principal as this reduction will not feed back into lower prices 
that would otherwise allow them to enhance their market footprint. 
 
Against this backdrop, the first main theory of harm associated with broad 
retail MFN clauses is reduced intra-brand rivalry and price uniformity across 
platforms. This is due to the fact that incentives for platforms to be more 
cost-efficient and to pass cost savings onto consumers via lower advertised 
prices are undermined and barriers to entry and expansion are reinforced 
(since new entrants would be barred from leading a low-price strategy). In this 
connection, entry foreclosure risks being greater where the entrant attempts 
to adopt a different business model, and where non-price competition does 
not make economic sense (e.g. due to network effects that may prevent entry 
by more efficient platforms than the incumbents).31 Nevertheless, if the new 
entrant adopts a business model similar to the incumbents' price parity 
clauses, it may afford the former certain protection.32 Ultimately, reduced 
price competition amongst online platforms translates into higher prices for 
consumers, insofar as the seller passes higher commissions through in the 
form of higher listed prices, and the process continues until the seller would 
be better off de-listing its product from the online platform.33 
 
Secondly, broad MFN clauses may reduce inter-brand competition, insofar 
as a sufficiently dense network of broad MFN clauses discourages sellers 
from competing vigorously, while, at the same time, collusion among them is 
easier (as their ability to enforce horizontal agreements is enhanced by the 
limited price variety).34 This price effect 'similar to direct collusion'35 is even 
more worrisome to trustbusters, as shown by the Commission's E-Books 
case36 or the Bundeskartellamt's HRS decision,37 the reason being that a 
                                                 
31 Lear (fn 23), paras 6.49-6.50. 
32 Andre Boik and Kenneth S Corts, 'The Effects of Platform MFNs on Competition 
and Entry' (2016) JL & Econ (forthcoming) 19. 
33 Competition and Markets Authority, 'Report on the Private Motor Insurance 
Market Investigation' (2014) para 8.42. 
34 Lear (fn 23), paras 6.44-6.45 and 6.64-6.65. 
35 Bundeskartellamt 20 December 2013 B9-66/10, para 157. 
36 E-Books (Case COMP/39.847) Commission Decision 2013/C 378/14 [2013] OJ 
C378/25. 
37 Bundeskartellamt (fn 35). 
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sufficient degree of inter-brand competition could compensate for the lack 
of intra-brand rivalry.38 A contrario, even uniform prices are likely to be 
competitive if enough inter-brand competition is guaranteed, which in turn 
depends on the number and size of platforms benefiting from parity clauses, 
the number of sellers bound by them, the relative bargaining power of 
platforms and sellers, or the availability of other price comparison tools (i.e. 
metasearch engines).39 
 
Other admittedly weaker theories of harm are the hindrance of incentives for 
innovation and investments by their lack of impact on lower final prices, and 
the conveyance by broad MFN clauses of a credible indication that prices 
advertised on the platform benefitting from such clauses are the lowest.40 
This second effect is only problematic if buyers are aware of the parity 
agreements and if they are price-elastic, as well as if other platforms do not 
lead the same low-cost strategy.41 
 
Besides, narrow MFN clauses are potentially less restrictive in that the seller 
is only bound not to offer through its own online (and sometimes also offline) 
channel lower prices than listed on the platform's website. Hence, despite the 
existence of such clauses, the seller may still leverage on its ability to lower 
prices in order to push commissions down. Nonetheless, a sufficiently thick 
lattice of narrow parity clauses might also lead to anticompetitive 
restrictions. For instance, it may incentivise the principal to spread out any 
increase in the commission charged by the agent among the prices advertised 
through other platforms in order not to reduce the competitiveness of its 
own channel. Thus, the effect of higher commissions on the advertised price 
would decrease and intra-brand competition on commissions would be 
stifled. Moreover, narrow MFN clauses weaken the competitive constraint 
imposed by the seller's direct channel on the online marketplaces, although 
this appears unlikely to be a problem so long as inter-brand competition is 
fostered by the easing of price comparison.42  
                                                 
38 Commission (fn 21), para 102. 
39 Ezrachi (fn 25), 14. 
40 ibid, 15. 
41 Lear (fn 23), paras. 6.66-6.70. 
42 Competition and Markets Authority (fn 33), paras 8.62-8.63. 
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Wholesale model 
 
Wholesale MFN clause between 
wholesaler and retailer 1: w1 ≤ w2 
 
Retail MFN clause between 
wholesaler and retailer 1: r1 ≤ r2 
 
Agency model 
Wholesale MFN clause between 
wholesaler and retailer 1: c1 ≥ c2 
Narrow retail MFN clause between 
wholesaler and retailer 1: P1 ≤ P3 
Broad retail MFN clause between 
wholesaler and retailer 1: P1 ≤ P2 and P3 
  
Figure 1: Main types of MFN clauses according to the supply chain level, 
business model and scope. 
 
Price parity clauses also give rise to remarkable benefits. First of all, they are 
primarily devised to solve the hold-up issue in vertical relations43 by 
preventing the seller from free-riding on the platform's specific 
demand-enhancing investments in the promotion of the seller's goods or 
services and brand image (e.g. marketing, advertising, after-sale services or 
guarantees), which also enhance the attractiveness of the online marketplace 
vis-à-vis other sale channels.44 For example, the pay-per-reservation model 
                                                 
43 According to Commission (fn 21), para 107(4), the hold-up problem is defined as the 
disincentive of the supplier or the buyer to undertake client-specific investments, 
such as in special equipment or training, before particular supply arrangements are 
fixed. 
44 Ezrachi (fn 25), 3-4. 
Consumers 
Retailer 1 Retailer 2 
Retailer 1 Retailer 2 
Wholesaler 
Consumers 
w1 w2 
r1 r3 r
c1 c2 
P1 P3 P2 
Wholesaler 
51 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol 9 No.1 
may incentivise hotels to use the platform to attract the customer and 
complete the booking through its own webpage.45 When this parasitism is 
horizontal, it can only be prevented by means of broad MFN clauses, whilst 
narrow parity clauses suffice to avoid vertical free-riding.46 
 
Other efficiencies resulting from parity clauses are the avoidance of delays in 
transactions because of the transparency of alternative bargains and the 
reduction in transaction costs.47 For instance, when negotiating long-term 
contracts, buyers can be certain that sellers will not place them at a 
competitive disadvantage while still bound by the contract by offering better 
conditions to competitors later on.48 This, in turn, directly benefits 
consumers by indicating the lowest prices and by easing switching. The 
enhancement of other forms of competition (e.g. quality, post-sale services 
or advertising) brought about by the prevention of the free-riding problem is 
equally noteworthy. 
 
2. The Perspective of National Competition Authorities 
The Commission's wait-and-see strategy has prompted a clash of paradigms 
as regards MFN clauses. The mirage of the joint (and balanced) position 
reached by the Swedish, French and Italian NCAs in their respective 
Booking.com decisions,49 under the aegis of the ECN, has been overtly 
challenged by the German Federal Cartel Office.50 
                                                 
45 González-Díaz and Bennett (fn 19), 34. 
46 By horizontal free-riding we understand online platforms' benefiting from one 
another's investments by offering better conditions, whereas this phenomenon is of 
a vertical nature where the seller itself undercuts the prices quoted on the online 
platform. 
47 Martha Samuelson, Nikita Piankov and Brian Ellman 'Assessing the Effects of Most-
Favored Nation Clauses' (American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Spring 
Meeting, March 2012), and Baker and Chevalier (fn 30). 
48 González-Díaz and Bennett (fn 19), 35-36. 
49 Konkurrensverket 15 April 2015 596/2013, Autorité de la Concurence (fn 20), and 
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato 21 April 2015 I779. 
50 Bundeskartellamt, 'Bundeskartellamt issues statement of objections regarding 
Booking.com's "best price" clauses' (Press release, 2 April 2015) <http://www.bundes 
kartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/02_04_2015_Bo
king.html> accessed on 8 May 2016. 
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As illustrated by the French example, the concerns over broad MFN clauses 
under the ECN orthodox approach were as follows: (i) the lessening of 
competition between Booking.com and the other distribution channels as far 
as hotels were deprived of their two main bargaining levers to respond to the 
level of commissions charged by Booking.com (i.e. retail prices and number 
of overnight stays);51 (ii) the risk of foreclosure of rival platforms, which were 
prevented from offering hotels lower commissions and, consequently, from 
passing the savings onto internet users in the form of lower prices and more 
availability of overnight stays;52 and (iii) the cumulative effect of the MFN 
lattice in place, which exacerbated the potential for restriction by means of 
increasing the market power of the otherwise atomised ensemble of OTAs.53 
 
The theories of harm listed above led to accepting Booking.com's 
commitments to, among others, (i) removing any parity clause regarding price 
and conditions vis-à-vis other OTAs and hotels' offline channel; (ii) 
completely removing any parity clause concerning availability; and (iii) 
respecting the possibility for hotels to revert to previous customers.54 
Therefore, narrow MFN clauses affecting hotels' online channel were not 
found to be a problem in principle. 
 
Particularly appealing and minimalist (albeit maybe overly simplistic) is the 
Scandinavian-design approach adopted by the Swedish authority, which 
appears to link vertical concerns to narrow parity, on the one hand, and 
horizontal restrictions to broad MFN clauses, on the other. This double 
dichotomy led the Konkurrentsverket to conclude that horizontally 
problematic wide party clauses should be considered restrictive in that 
Booking.com had less incentives to compete by offering hotels low 
commission rates, thereby pushing hotel room prices up.55 On the contrary, 
narrow parity clauses are purely vertical (insofar as hotels' direct channel and 
                                                 
51 Autorité de la Concurence (fn 20), para 122. 
52 ibid, para 123. 
53 ibid, paras 127-129. 
54 ibid, para 230. 
55 Konkurrensverket (fn 49), paras 21. 
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OTAs do not compete on the same relevant market)56 and should 
consequently be blessed to the extent that they do not give rise to restrictions 
on competition on any neighbouring market. Moreover, narrow MFN 
clauses foster inter-brand competition via enhanced transparency and reduce 
the risk that hotels free-ride on investments made by the platform.57 
 
This lax stance of the ECN champions towards narrow price parity clauses − 
later confirmed by Italian and Swedish NCAs' closure of proceedings against 
Expedia58 − stands in stark contrast with the German watchdog's position. In 
this regard, the Düsseldorf High Regional Court's upholding of the 
Bundeskartellamt's decision to completely ban (broad) MFN clauses as vertical 
restrictions was interpreted by the latter as a full-fledged 'principle in relation 
to restrictions of competition in the Internet' (against which the 
commitments offered by Booking.com would be insufficient).59 Later on, the 
Federal Cartel Office confirmed its stern position by rejecting 
ECN-designed Booking.com's commitments on the grounds that narrow 
price parity clauses 'also restrict both competition between existing portals 
and competition between the hotels themselves' (in the words of the 
authority's president Andreas Mundt).60 The order to remove price parity 
clauses was subsequently challenged by Booking.com and upheld by the 
Düsseldorf High Regional Court.61 
 
                                                 
56 ibid, para 25. 
57 ibid, paras 26, 27 and 30. 
58 Konkurrensverket 10 October 2015 595/2015, and Autorità Garante della Conco-
rrenza e del Mercato 11 April 2016 I779. 
59 Bundeskartellamt (fn 50). 
60 Lewis Crofts, 'Booking.com's pricing clauses ruled illegal in Germany (update*)' 
(MLex, 23 December 2016) <http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.as 
px?cid=800911&siteid=190&rdir=1> accessed on 7 June 2016. 
61 Matthew Newman, 'Booking.com loses bid to suspend German antitrust decision at 
Düsseldorf court' (MLex, 9 May 2016) 
<http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/Detai 
lView.aspx?cid=793030&siteid=190&rdir=1> accessed on 10 May 2016. 
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Nonetheless, a compromise remains possible so far as the Bundeskartellamt's 
decisions refer to the specific circumstances of the German market62 and do 
not conclusively state the hard-core (by-object) nature of price parity 
schemes (although this has been openly suggested by Andreas Mundt63). In 
HRS, the German watchdog highlighted that the platform's market share 
exceeded 30%,64 thereby Regulation 330/201065 not being applicable 
regardless of the question whether the MFN clauses at hand amounted to a 
blacklisted hard-core restriction.66 Other case-specific circumstances were 
taken into consideration, e.g. active monitoring and enforcement by HRS 
and the particular conditions of the market, namely the existence of MFN 
clauses in agreements between hotels and HRS's two closest rivals 
(Booking.com and Expedia).67 This market-specific argument has been 
reversed by the Italian NCA to drop the probe into Expedia after this OTA 
accepted to adjust its terms and conditions along the lines of Booking.com's 
commitments. The Italian trustbuster concluded that market circumstances 
(that originally posed competition concerns) changed as a result of both 
major players abandoning the problematic clauses and, thus, the investigation 
was left without purpose.68 
 
Moreover, ECN-led Booking.com and German HRS decisions seemed to agree 
on the vertical nature of narrow parity,69 as well as on the fact that OTAs and 
hotels' direct channels are not active in the same relevant market,70 which 
                                                 
62 Philippe Chappatte and Helen Townley, 'Online Hotel Bookings - A Joint European 
Approach or a Most Favoured Nation?' (Slaughter and May, Briefing, May 2015), 3 
<https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2497093/online-hotel-bookings-a-joint-
european-approach-or-a-most-favoured-nation.pdf> accessed on 8 May 2016. 
63 Crofts and Eccles (fn 18). 
64 Bundeskartellamt (fn 35), paras 188-195. 
65 Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) TFEU to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ 
L102/1. 
66 Bundeskartellamt (fn 35), para 187. 
67 Vandenborre and Frese (fn 22), 591. 
68 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (fn 58), para 57. 
69 Konkurrensverket (fn 49), para 20, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato (fn 49) para 7, Autorité de la Concurence (fn 20), para 7, and 
Bundeskartellamt (fn 35), para 10. 
70 For all, Konkurrensverket (fn 49), para 25, and Bundeskartellamt (fn 35), para 87. 
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entails that restrictions on the prices offered through hotels' own sites must 
not be in principle anticompetitive. This fact ‒ along with the attention paid 
to market specificities not only by the Bundeskartellamt but also by the Italian 
and Swedish NCAs in their more recent Expedia decisions ‒ appears to 
provide the Commission with sound arguments to steer towards a common 
ground between these seemingly opposed paradigms. This task must be 
orchestrated in Berlaymont for the legal, institutional, economic and policy 
reasons presented in Section II and given the inability of national watchdogs 
to reach the uniform response that these reasons demand. 
 
Across the Channel, the limited concern over narrow parity clauses shown by 
the British Competition and Markets Authority (evinced in the closure of its 
enquiry into hotels' online discounting restrictions on administrative priority 
grounds) focused on the vertical aspect.71 Nonetheless, one year before, the 
British trustbuster had highlighted the intra-brand concerns over broad 
MFN clauses in contracts between private motor insurance providers and 
price comparison websites (PCWs), since the detriment to consumers 'was 
likely to be significant as wide MFNs effectively prevented price competition 
between PCWs'.72 
 
                                                 
71 Competition and Markets Authority 'CMA closes hotel online booking 
investigation' (Press release, 16 September 2015) <https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/news/cma-closes-hotel-online-booking-investigation> accessed on 8 
May 2016. 
72 Competition and Markets Authority (fn 33), para 8.123. 
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Points in common between ECN 
and Federal Cartel Office 
Rifts between ECN and Federal Cartel 
Office 
ECN Federal Cartel Office 
 OTAs and hotels' direct channel 
belong to different relevant 
markets. 
 Broad price parity clauses are 
prohibited vertical restrictions, 
although not conclusively 
classified as hard-core (by-object) 
restrictions ineligible for block 
exemption under Regulation 
330/2010. 
 Market-specific circumstances 
and factual considerations may 
play a relevant role. 
 Narrow price 
parity clauses are 
in principle not 
problematic. 
 Commitments 
offered by 
Booking.com 
remove 
concerns. 
 Narrow price parity 
clauses may restrict 
competition. 
 Commitments 
offered by 
Booking.com do not 
sufficiently address 
concerns. 
Figure 2: Main points in common and rifts between the ECN and German 
positions. 
 
3. Legal Qualification 
Although the ECJ rulings in Intel73 and Post Danmark II74 appeared to have 
smothered the embers of the 'more economic approach' (at least when it 
comes to Article 102), Groupement des Cartes Bancaires and Maxima Latvija 
judgements recently blew on them as regards Article 101. Since discussing 
these rulings is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that the Court, 
albeit cautiously, revisited the expansionist notion of restrictions by object 
and placed on authorities the charge of conducting a preliminary factual 
analysis in order to establish that a certain degree of harm is inherent to the 
conduct at stake for it to be considered a restriction by object.75 
 
If this jurisprudential development were to have a resonance in the field of 
price parity clauses, it is contended in this paper that the preliminary 
assessment of the degree of harm of MFN clauses should look mainly at the 
factors presented in Section III.1: (i) business model and level of the supply 
chain at which the clause operates; (ii) scope of the parity clauses; (iii) relative 
market power of sellers and platforms; (iv) concentration of the upstream and 
                                                 
73 Case T-286/09 Intel v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:547. 
74 Case C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet ECLI:EU:C:2015:651. 
75 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (fn 1), para 58, and Maxima Latvija (fn 1), para 17. 
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downstream markets; (v) number of platforms benefitting from, and sellers 
bound by, such clauses; (vi) the proportion of the seller's overall sales made 
through the platform; (vii) or the availability of other price comparison 
mechanisms (i.e. metasearch sites). 
 
Furthermore, legal qualification of MFN clauses as horizontal or vertical 
restrictions becomes of the utmost importance. Firstly, vertical restraints are 
more likely to be subject to a by-effect exam pursuant to the recent narrower 
interpretation of infringements by-object. In this vein, the Maxima Latvija 
judgement (which ruled out the restrictive object of a commercial lease 
agreement conferring on the tenant a right to veto the leasing of other 
premises in the same shopping centre) contrasts with the traditional 
by-object analysis carried out in the Eturas ruling76 (in which the vertically 
related platform just played the role of a hub in an alleged horizontal 
concerted practice). 
 
Secondly, if concerns posed by MFN clauses were limited to the vertical 
plane, they would be eligible for exemption under Regulation 330/2010, with 
market definition coming to the forefront in that case. As hard-core 
restrictions cannot be exempted under Regulation 330/2010, the by-object 
issue comes full circle. In other words, not being blacklisted in Article 4 of 
Regulation 330/2010 as hard-core restrictions, there is no reason to consider 
vertical price parity schemes prima facie excluded from block exemption, not 
even from the de minimis safe harbour77 to the extent that they are not 
considered restrictions by object.78 This would be consistent with the 
Commission's Guidelines on Vertical Restraints not considering MFN 
clauses as necessarily leading to retail price maintenance.79 The fact that in 
the Booking.com cases cited above the market share above 30% prevented 
                                                 
76 Case C-74/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, 'Eturas' UAB v Lietuvos Respublikos konkure-
ncijos taryba. 
77 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably 
restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (de minimis) [2001] OJ C368/13, para 11(2). 
78 Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795, Expedia. 
79 Commission (fn 21), para 48. 
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eligibility for block exemption80 and the case-by-case approach required by 
the breadth of the phenomenon at hand militate in favour of the applicability 
to purely vertical MFN clauses of both the Regulation 330/2010 exemption 
and the de minimis rule. 
 
This proposed distinction between MFN clauses in horizontal agreements ‒ 
in which a by-object analysis is more deeply engrained ‒ and vertical price 
parity ‒ more prone to by-effect assessment ‒ mirrors to a certain extent the 
position taken by the American antitrust authorities. In the United States, 
the assessment of MFN clauses is usually conducted under the rule of reason 
(by pondering over direct or indirect proof of likely damages and benefits 
arising from the clauses) where they are not part of an agreement between 
competitors.81 It seems clear that the rule of reason as such has no place in 
the EU competition legal framework82 and the balancing of anti-competitive 
and pro-competitive effects must be conducted exclusively within the 
framework of Article 101(3).83 However, the element of appreciability has a 
role to play in by-effect cases (unlike in by-object settings),84 in which an 
appreciable anti-competitive effect cannot be presumed and Article 101(1) 
does not apply if the likely negative effect is insignificant.85 
 
4. Corollary and Proposed Enforcement Approach 
By way of corollary, the Commission should make clear that a by-object 
analysis is only appropriate where the preliminary assessment of the degree 
of harm reveals that the broad MFN clauses in place are a device for either 
horizontal coordination amongst sellers (as in the E-Books case) or vertical 
price-fixing at the level of platforms. As explained in Section III.3, the 
preliminary degree-of-harm appraisal of the economic and legal context 
                                                 
80 Konkurrensverket (fn 49), para 18. 
81 Steven C Salop and Fiona S Morton, 'Developing an Administrable MFN 
Enforcement Policy' (2013) 27(2) Antitrust Magazine 15, 17. 
82 Richard Whish and Brenda Sufrin, 'Article 85 and the Rule of Reason' (1987) 7(1) 
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SEC (2004) OJ C101/97, para 11. 
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should focus on, inter alia, the business model, the supply chain level and 
scope of the clause, the relative market power of sellers and platforms, the 
concentration of the upstream and downstream markets, the density of the 
MFN lattice, the proportion of the seller's overall sales made through the 
platform, and the availability of other price comparison mechanisms. 
 
Narrow MFN schemes, in turn, should be subject to a by-effect assessment 
in view of their limited degree of harm, except where either they are devised 
to conceal an Eturas-like arrangement (tantamount to a concerted practice) 
or a sufficiently tight weave of narrow MFN clauses produces an effect 
equivalent to a more subtle hub-and-spoke setting resulting in the fixing of a 
minimum price. 
 
At any rate, price parity clauses that are not intended (i.e. do not have as their 
object) to allow for horizontal coordination at the level of sellers − or, in the 
case of broad MFN clauses, at the level of platforms − should be eligible for 
exemption under Regulation 330/2010 or even considered of minor 
importance under the de minimis Notice, as asserted in Section III.3. 
 
As an additional remark, while the Eturas case seems to hint at a return to 
Apple horizontal suspicions, the national enquiries to which the Commission 
seems to have relinquished the EU-wide approach appear to gravitate 
towards vertical concerns. Therefore, one could argue that a first stage in the 
assessment of parity clauses should revolve around determining whether they 
represent a stand-alone concern or whether they are only problematic as an 
instrument for more serious restrictions (i.e. namely collusion or resale price 
maintenance). After all, the reference to MFN clauses in the Vertical 
Guidelines is limited to their role as indirect means of achieving price-
fixing.86 
 
In a nutshell, although the patchwork of national cases provides some useful 
inputs (e.g. focus on vertical concerns, lax stance towards narrow parity 
clauses, or consideration of factual and market-specific aspects), EU 
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guidance is required to develop a systematic and coherent methodology 
based on the elements summarised in this Section. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
EU and national trustbusters across the Old Continent have, from the very 
outset, showed a tendency to shoehorn any market development in the stale 
original legal framework come hell or high waters. This inveterate propensity 
has never been so worrisome as it is now in the current landscape of 
skyrocketing technological development. The reason is that the digital world 
has brought about a number of new phenomena transcending the physical 
borders of Member States (as prominently evinced by the MFN cases HRS, 
Booking.com and Expedia). Therefore, the ever-postponed innovative response 
required to capture an increasingly complex reality cannot be left to unguided 
national discretion for the multiple reasons stated in Section II. 
 
Furthermore, the stage seems to have been set by the Court for the 
Commission to cut the Gordian knot of the worn out object-based 
supremacy; something that can be done without necessarily breaking away 
from the fundamental object-effect dichotomy, but using existing legal 
categories, as explored in Section III.3. Hence, it is time for the Guardian of 
the Treaties to grasp the nettle and avail of the momentum created by the 
ECJ case-law to lay the foundations for a new and sound effects-oriented 
position towards MFN clauses and other genuinely online restrictions. 
 
Indeed, as explained in detail in Section II, the Commission is the best placed 
to develop a systematic and coherent enforcement approach based on the 
elements listed in Section III.4, which NCAs have failed to produce so far. 
Setting forth clear guidelines on e-commerce (that NCAs could subsequently 
apply in national proceedings) would contribute to the Digital Single Market 
by creating a more business-friendly environment (that refrains from 
strangling new business models) and by safeguarding legal certainty. 
 
We live in a brave new world, as Shakespeare poetically remarked more than 
four centuries ago, that calls for an equally not only brave, but also new 
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response by the whilom motor of European integration that once again lags 
behind long-legged (but often short-sighted) national watchdogs. 
 
